Interconnectedness as a source of uncertainty in systemic risk by Roukny, Tarik et al.
Interconnectedness as a Source of Uncertainty in Systemic Risk I
Tarik Rouknya, Stefano Battistonb, Joseph E. Stiglitzc
aUniversite´ Libre de Bruxelles, E-Mail: troukny@ ulb. ac. be
bDept. Banking and Finance, University of Zurich
cColumbia University
Abstract
Financial networks have shown to be important in understanding systemic events in credit
markets. In this paper, we investigate how the structure of those networks can affect
the capacity of regulators to assess the level of systemic risk. We introduce a model to
compute the individual and systemic probability of default in a system of banks connected
in a generic network of credit contracts and exposed to external shocks with a generic
correlation structure. Even in the presence of complete knowledge, we identify conditions
on the network for the emergence of multiple equilibria. Multiple equilibria give rise to
uncertainty in the determination of the default probability. We show how this uncertainty
can affect the estimation of systemic risk in terms of expected losses. We further quantify
the effects of cyclicality, leverage, volatility and correlations. Our results are relevant to
the current policy discussions on new regulatory framework to deal with systemic events
of distress as well as on the desirable level of regulatory data disclosure.
Keywords: financial networks, systemic risk, uncertainty, regulatory framework,
contagion
1. Introduction
The emergence of systemic risk in financial networks is receiving increasing attention
in the literature (Stiglitz, 2008; Allen and Babus, 2009; Acemoglu et al., 2015a) and among
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regulators (IMF, 2015; Yellen, 2013). Network effects matter for financial stability because
shocks can be amplified along various channels: common funding sources can lead to a
spreading of bank runs (e.g. Diamond and Dybvig, 1983; Goldstein and Pauzner, 2004);
balance sheet interlocks (e.g. loans, repurchasing agreement, derivatives, etc.) can lead to
cascades of defaults, (e.g. Allen and Gale, 2000; Eisenberg and Noe, 2001) or propagation
of distress (Battiston et al., 2012); exposures to common assets can lead to a spiral of
fire sales and deleveraging across banks (e.g. Caballero and Simsek, 2013; Caccioli et al.,
2014).
The main focus of the literature has been so far on understanding how the structure of
the financial network (along the various aforementioned channels) can mitigate or amplify
systemic risk (Elsinger et al., 2006; Gai and Kapadia, 2010; Gai et al., 2011; Georg,
2013; Cont et al., 2013; Roukny et al., 2013; Elliott et al., 2014; Acemoglu et al., 2015b;
Glasserman and Young, 2015). Fewer works have been devoted to understanding how the
structure of the financial network can instead affect the very ability to assess systemic risk.
At the regulatory level, forecasting limitations is a source of uncertainty that, in turn, can
make any decision potentially harmful to the system despite the apparent need for action
(Bernanke, 2009). At the individual level, uncertainty about cross exposures and losses
of counterparties can trigger panic and fire sales even from healthy banks (Caballero and
Simsek, 2013; Alvarez and Barlevy, 2014).
In this paper, we develop a model of a financial network that includes an interbank
market as well as external assets and external sources of funds. In spirit, our model is
closest to (Elsinger et al., 2006; Rogers and Veraart, 2013) who build on the frameworks
introduced by (Eisenberg and Noe, 2001) in which a clearing vector of payments and a
recovery rate is determined after the maturity of the contracts (i.e., ex-post) assuming
different levels of liquidation efficiency. Instead, we are here interested in ex-ante valuation
of contracts in order to determine probabilities of default. Furthermore, as in practice
asset liquidation implies lengthy legal settlements, we assume that, in the short run,
recovery rates are limited (Cont et al., 2013).
Our first contribution is thus to provide a framework that allows to compute ana-
lytically the probability of default of any subset of banks for a generic structure of the
interbank network and a generic structure of shocks correlation among external assets.
To our knowledge, few works have provided a simple solution to this problem (Gourie´roux
et al., 2013; Glasserman and Young, 2015). The simplicity of our result stems from the
analysis of the set of default conditions as a system of coupled equations in the space of
shocks.
Our second contribution is to show how, even in the case of complete knowledge of
the web of contracts and distributions of shocks, multiple equilibria can exist depending
on the network structure. Those co-existing equilibria may include the case in which all
banks default and the case in which no bank defaults, as well as intermediate cases. More
precisely, we show that, under mild conditions on the balance sheets across banks, a suf-
ficient condition for multiple equilibria to exist is that the interbank network architecture
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exhibits cyclical structures, i.e. at least one closed chain of lending ties. The reason is
that a closed chain of lending ties implies a mutual dependence of the interbank asset
values1.
A common way to deal with multiple equilibria is to add to the model some mechanism
of equilibrium selection, in order to be able to focus only on one equilibrium2. However,
making assumptions on the equilibrium selection process rules out by construction an
intrinsic uncertainty that may be valuable to assess. Indeed, both from the point of view
of a firm in a network of contracts as well as for the regulator, uncertainty is fundamental
for decision making (Caballero and Simsek, 2013; De Grauwe and Ji, 2015). In this
paper, our goal is precisely to characterise the uncertainty stemming from equilibrium
multiplicity.
Accordingly, our third contribution is the quantification of this uncertainty, that is,
the extent of the area of multiplicity of equilibria in the space of the shocks. While the
realisation of each equilibrium is mathematically consistent with the set of conditions,
there might be different mechanisms at work leading the system to one equilibrium rather
than another. In fact, each equilibrium is the result of a coordination of actions at
the agent level which, in turn, depends on each agent’s belief. In this paper, we do
not model explicitly the mechanisms that could lead to coordination. We focus instead
on the relation between the structure of the financial network and the existence of the
multiplicity3.
We further quantify how the uncertainty is affected by the network structure and
potential correlations across banks’ portfolio returns. In particular, we determine the
difference between the probability of default in an optimistic scenario (i.e. the equilib-
rium with the least number of defaulting banks) and in a pessimistic scenario (i.e. the
equilibrium with the highest number of defaulting banks) and we introduce a method to
measure the cost of equilibrium selection in terms of expected losses. For instance, we
show that a market structure in which banks are arranged in a ring of obligations bears
less uncertainty then a centralized structure in which one bank lends to and borrows from
1The existence of multiple equilibria due to mutual dependence between agents also relates to previous
work on specific ring structures reported in (see chap.7 in Stiglitz and Greenwald, 2003).
2For example, both in (Rogers and Veraart, 2013) and in (Elliott et al., 2014), the authors rank
the equilibria according to a systemic risk criteria (e.g., the number of defaults) and select the first
equilibrium.
3There are several mechanisms that could make agents coordinate on socially good or bad equilibria.
Such a coordination could be rational, if the equilibrium is consistent with the beliefs, or not. The
rational case further includes sunspot equilibria as described in (Stiglitz and Greenwald, 2003). While
the mechanisms leading to the good equilibrium can be very simple (i.e., rational incentives for each bank
to survive), the bad equilibrium case can result from information asymmetry, interest rate dynamics, and
the combination of liquidity hoarding and asset fire sales. In the latter, if agents come to believe that
external assets held by their counterparties are overpriced they will hoard liquidity and sell assets, thus
inducing counterparties to do the same, effectively causing a coordination on socially bad equilibria.
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all others mainly due to an increase of number of cycles in the network. We also find
that correlations have an ambiguous effect on uncertainty. Correlations across shocks in-
crease uncertainty when banks balance sheets are homogenous, but decrease uncertainty
for certain heterogeneous allocations of assets across banks.
The insights from this work are relevant to three current policy discussions. A first
discussion concerns the lack of a satisfactory framework to deal with too-big-to-fail insti-
tutions and with systemic events of distress in the financial system (Haldane and May,
2011; BoE, 2013). In this respect, our work makes a contribution to the stream of work
aimed a estimating the systemic impact of financial institutions in a network context. A
second discussion concerns the level of financial data disclosure on the side of individ-
ual institutions that would be desirable for the regulator to properly assess systemic risk
(Abbe et al., 2012). Our results show that the knowledge of the structure is crucial to
assess systemic risk but that some level of uncertainty is intrinsic to more interconnected
systems. A third discussion concerns the role of the regulator (Draghi, 2012; Miller and
Zhang, 2014; De Grauwe and Ji, 2015): in the presence of multiple equilibria, the ac-
tions of the regulator can affect, voluntarily or not, the equilibrium selection. On the one
hand, our model helps to quantify the expected monetary loss due to a misassessment
of systemic risk. On the other hand, our model also allows to identify when instead the
outcomes are very close and, thus, regulatory decisions would have limited impact.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section (2) describes the model. Section
(3) analyses necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of multiple equilibria.
Section (4) shows how to compute default probability in different scenarios and analyses
the effect of the structure of the network and the effect of correlations across shocks.
Section (5) introduces a method to compute the expected losses . Finally, section (6)
concludes.
2. The Model
We consider a financial network with over-the-counter (OTC) credit contracts among
n agents or, for simplicity, banks. We distinguish between secured contracts (i.e. banks
have to post a collateral in order to receive a loan) within the banking system itself (“in-
terbank”) and contracts of banks on securities outside the banking system (“external”).
Formally, we define the interbank financial network as a directed graph as follows.
Definition 1. The network or graph G is the pair (N,E) where N is a set of nodes
representing the banks and a set of edges E representing directed credit contracts between
two banks going from the lender to the borrower.
2.1. Timing of the model
The timing of the model is as follows. At time 1, banks raise funds and make in-
vestments in external and interbank assets. At time 2, the values of the external assets
are shocked and updated. While the shock distribution is known at time 1, shocks are
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Figure 1: An illustration of an interbank market of 3 banks borrowing and lending from each other and
also investing in some external assets.
only observed at time 2. At time 2 the interbank contracts mature and their value is
also updated depending on the shocks that have occurred. For each bank i, the main
quantities are detailed in the following section.
2.2. Balance Sheets
Assets and liabilities of i on the external markets are denoted as aEi and `
E
i . Assets
and liabilities of i on the interbank credit market are denoted as aBi and `
B
i . Additionally,
banks also hold other assets (e.g., treasury bonds) used as collateral for their interbank
liabilities, denoted as aCi . Total assets and liabilities are respectively denoted as ai and
`i. Below we detail the different types of assets. Figure (3) illustrates the model.
2.2.1. External Assets
At time 1, each bank i allocates its external assets in a portfolio of securities on the
external markets. Let Eik denote the fraction of i’s external assets invested at time 1
in the security k. The unitary value of the external security k is xEk . Without loss of
generality: at time 1, xEk (1) = 1 for all k, while x
E
k (2) is a random variable drawn from
a given distribution. At time 2, then the external assets of bank i, is a sum of random
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variables:
aEi (2) = a
E
i (1)
∑
k
Eikx
E
k (2). (1)
For our purposes, it is sufficient to assume that we can express the external assets of bank
i as follows:
aEi (2) = a
E
i (1)(1 + µi + σi ui), (2)
where ui is a random variable drawn from a given distribution with mean zero and variance
one, the parameter µi is the expected net return of the portfolio and σi its standard
deviation. We also assume to know the joint probability distribution p(u1, ..., un). Let us
define ei(1) as the equity of bank i at time 1. It is then convenient to use the parameter
εi =
aEi (1)
ei(1)
which measures the magnitude, per unit of initial equity of bank i, of the
investments of bank i in external assets. We thus obtain:
aEi (2)
ei(1)
= εi(1 + µi + σi ui). (3)
2.2.2. Interbank Assets
At time 1, each bank i allocates its interbank assets among the other banks, Bij
denoting the fraction of i’s interbank assets invested at time 1 in the liability of bank j.
Let us define a default indicator χj(t), with χj(t) = 1 in case of default of bank i at time
t and χj(t) = 0 otherwise. The unitary value of the interbank liability of bank j to bank
i is xBij(χj(t)).
If all banks are assume to not default at time 1, we have without loss of generality:
xBij(χj(1)) = 1 for all i and j. The liabilities of bank j are constant in value from the
perspective of bank i, i.e. the debt agreed upon in the contract at time 1. However, from
the point of view of counterparties of j, xBij(χj(2)) = 1 if bank j honors its obligation,
xBij(χj(2)) = Rij otherwise, where Rij is the recovery rate, i.e. the fraction of assets that
the lender can recover after the default of j. In formulas:
∀i, j
{
xBij(χj(2) = 0) = 1
xBij(χj(2) = 1) = Rij
(4)
Accordingly, at time 2, the interbank assets of bank i, is
aBi (2) = a
B
i (1)
∑
j
Bijx
B
ij(χj(2)). (5)
Similar to the external assets, we introduce the parameter βi =
aBi (1)
ei(1)
, which measures
the magnitude, per unit of initial equity, of i’s investments in interbank assets. We thus
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obtain:
aBi (2)
ei(1)
= βi
∑
j
xBij(χj(2)). (6)
2.2.3. Risk-free assets used as collateral
Finally, banks hold some assets aCi to be used as collateral for their borrowing. We
assume that these assets are risk-free (e.g., treasury bonds) and that their value does not
change across the two periods (i.e., aCi (2) = a
C
i (1)):
aCi (2) =
∑
j
Rijl
B
ij , (7)
where Rij is the fraction of the interbank liability l
B
ij that is secured by the collateral. Sim-
ilar to the previous cases, we introduce the parameter γi, which measures the magnitude,
per unit of initial equity, of i’s collateralised assets:
aCi (2)
ei(1)
= γi. (8)
2.3. Default Condition
As it is standard in financial accounting, we consider that an agent i defaults when
its equity at time (2) is negative (i.e., ai(2)− li(2) < 0). Assuming that the funding side
remains constant between time (1) and (2) (i.e. no liability shock), we can re-express such
condition in equity relative terms, that is, we divide by the value of equity at time (1)
using Equations (3), (6) and (8). Note that, in equity relative terms, the liability side is
equal to the value of the asset side relative to the equity at time (1) minus the equity, we
obtain :
εi(1 + µi + σiui) + βi(
∑
j
Bijx
B
ij(χj)) + γ − (εi + βi + γi − 1) < 0. (9)
Finally, we express the above condition as a function of the stochastic shock variable on
the external assets ui. We obtain a condition such that if the external shock is below a
threshold θi, this leads to the default of bank i:
ui < θi =
−εiµi + βi(1−
∑
Bijx
B
ij(χj))− 1
εiσi
. (10)
Where θi is the threshold value below which ui would cause the default of i. Notice
the we have dropped the time in the notation. Thus, depending on the magnitude and
the sign of the shock ui on each bank, some can default on their obligations, potentially
pushing other banks to default.
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We can now express the default indicators χi of all banks as a system of equations
∀i χi = Θ(ui − θi(χ1, ..., χn)), (11)
where Θ denotes the step function (or Heaviside function, i.e. equals one if the argument
is positive, zero otherwise). A solution of the system above is denoted as χ∗. We define
an equilibrium as follows:
Definition 2. An equilibrium is a vector of default indicators χ = {χ1, ..., χn} that is a
solution to Equation (11).
Because Equation (11) is a system of non-linear equations, in general there can be
multiple equilibria. This aspect will be analysed in Section (3).
2.4. Threshold Values
From the above definitions, it follows that the threshold value of every bank i can take a
finite amount of different values depending on the identity of i’s counterparties that default
at time 2. Note that, in case of homogeneity, only the number of defaulting counterparties
matters and not their identity. Let Vi denote the subset of banks borrowing from bank i
and |Vi| the cardinality of such a set. Let Λi be the discrete set of all values that θi can take,
sorted by ascending order, Λi = {θ1i , ..., θλii } with θsi ≤ θti if 0 < s < t < λi and s, t ∈ N.
As every counterparty can have 2 states (i.e., χj = 1 or χj = 0), we denote the number
of values that θi can take as λi such that:
λi = |Λi| ≤ 2|Vi|. (12)
We can characterize the minimum and maximum values that the threshold can take,
respectively θ1i and θ
λi
i . For convenience, we will refer to those values as θ
−
i and θ
+
i .
Intuitively, the former corresponds to the case where all counterparties do not default
(i.e., xBij = 1 ∀j ∈ Vi) while the latter corresponds to the case where all counterparties
default (i.e., xBij = Rij ∀j ∈ Vi). From Equation (10) it follows:{
θ−i =
−εiµi−1
εiσi
θ+i =
−εiµi+βi(1−
∑
j BijRij)−1
εiσi
= θ−i +
βi(1−Ri)
εiσi
,
(13)
where for convenience we denote by Ri =
∑
j BijRij the total amount of collateral that
bank i recovers from the default of its counterparties.
The equation above shows that as long as Ri < 1 and the parameters εi, σi, βi are
positive, it follows that θ−i < θ
+
i . This reflects the fact that it is easier to default when
all counterparties have defaulted than when none has defaulted. Indeed, a larger value of
the threshold implies that more shocks will fall below the threshold.
An equivalent way to interpret θ−i is to view it as the threshold condition below which
a shock would lead bank i to default irrespective of its counterparties’ default state (recall
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that in our model shocks on the external assets can be positive or negative). Indeed, if
the shock is below θ−i , bank i defaults even if none of its counterparties defaults. Hence,
it does not matter whether there are some default or not, the shock will always lead to
the default of bank i. In contrast, θ+i represents the minimal shock needed to sustain the
worse case scenario, i.e. when bank i has lost all its investments in the interbank market,
apart from the collateral.
In the remainder of this section, we discuss the parameter’s value of interest for our
study. Given that the shock variable ui is random and assumed to be between −1 and 1,
we identify conditions under which the value of ui has an effect on the default of bank i.
Let us start with the extreme cases:
• when θi ≤ −1. In this case, no matter what the value of the shock ui is, the bank
will never default.
• when θi ≥ 1. In this case, no matter what the value of the shock ui is, the bank will
always default.
• when −1 < θi < 1. In this case, the default is a function of the shock ui. Hence, we
are interested in this range of values.
As our study will focus on thresholds whose values belong to the third point, let us analyse
what are the underlying parameter conditions for that condition to hold. In order to do
so, we can focus on the two extreme thresholds values, θ−i and θ
+
i , as any other θi ∈ Λi
will be comprised between those two extremes.
For the case of θ−i , using Equation (13) on the above condition, we have:
− 1 < θ−i < 1↔
{
−εi(µi − σi) > 1
−εi(µi + σi) < 1
(14)
To interpret the elements εi(µi−σi) and εi(µi+σi), recall the expression of the volatility
of the external portfolio at time 2 and extract the changes with time 1: εi(µi + uiσi).
Hence, the two expressions result from the extreme cases where ui is equal to -1 and 1,
respectivelly. As we are framing our accounting in terms relative to the equity, we have
that the equity is equal to 1. It is thus possible to read the conditions of Equation (14)
as a set of 2 conditions on the effect of the worse shock and best shock. The worse shock,
that is, when ui = −1, must yield a return on the external asset that is a loss larger than
the equity. The best shock, that is, when ui = 1, must yield a return on the external
asset that can be a loss but not larger than the equity.
Similarly, for the case of θ+i , we have:
− 1 < θ+i < 1↔
{
−εi(µi + σi) < 1− βi(1−Ri)
−εi(µi − σi) > 1− βi(1−Ri)
(15)
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Following the same reasoning as for the interpretation on the conditions for θ−i , similar
results hold with the subtraction of the element βi(1− Ri) from the equity. Indeed, this
element represents the fraction of assets covered by collateral in terms relative to the
equity. Hence, 1− βi(1− Ri) represents the equity of bank i after all its borrowers have
defaulted and all the collateral has been transfered to bank i.
It is clear that all values of θi do not have to be constrained between -1 and 1. Nev-
ertheless, those ranges are the ones of interest when focusing on default scenarios. The
above exercise is thus an illustration of how to interpret the conditions under which the
network of contracts and the distribution of external shocks will have an effect on the
system’s equilibrium.
For convenience and without loss of generality, we can thus use the following expres-
sion:
θˆi = min{max{θi,−1}, 1} (16)
where θˆi is the result of a cut-off on both sides of the threshold variable. Indeed, as
shown above, when values of θi exceed the range [−1, 1], the results become independent
of the rest of the system conditions.
3. Multiple Equilibria
We now analyse under which conditions the system of equations characterizing the
default (i.e., Equation (11)) leads to multiple equilibria. In particular, we are interested
in identifying the conditions on the network structure leading to unique or multiple solu-
tions. Indeed, the structure of the network of contracts enters in the default conditions
of Equation (10) via the matrix Bij of interbank assets. For each bank i, the associated
equation has a default thresholds θi that is a function of the bank’s borrowing counter-
parties’ default status. Such subset of banks is, in turn, determined by the network of
contracts.
Let us define the notions of walks, paths and simple cycles, that will then be used to
address the multiplicity of equilibria.
Definition 3. A walk Wi1,ik connecting bank i1 and ik is a sequence of banks (i1, i2, ..., ik)
such that the ordered pairs (i1i2), (i2i3),...,(ik−1ik) ∈ E, i.e. are edges in the network. A
walk is closed if the first and last bank in the sequence are the same, and open if they are
different. The length of the walk is given by the number of edges it contains, i.e. any walk
W (i1, ik) has length k1. A simple cycle, denoted by Cn, is a closed walk encompassing n
different banks and n− 1 edges.
In simple terms, in an interbank financial network, a cycle is thus an arrangement of
contracts that can be displayed on a circle such that a bank at a position i is borrowing
from its left neighbour and lending to its right neighbour. Using this definition, we can now
state the necessary and sufficient condition for the system to generate multiple equilibria.
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Proposition 1 (Multiple Equilibria). Consider the case of N banks, with: recovery
rate Ri < 1; interbank leverage βi > 0; external leverage εi and shock variance σi positive
and finite; shock mean µi finite. Multiple equilibria exist if and only if:
1. there exists a simple cycle Ck of credit contracts along k ≥ 2 banks
2. for each bank i and its borrowing counterparty i+ 1 along the cycle Ck, it holds that
θˆi(χ1, ..., χi, 0, ..., χk) 6= θˆi(χ1, ..., χi, 1, ..., χk)
Proof. See Appendix A.
The necessary and sufficient conditions in the proposition above relate to two related
but different aspects. The first is the network structure: there can only be multiple
solutions to the Equation (11) if the network contains at least 2 banks whose default
condition depend upon each other’s default status. More in general, a cycle is a chain
of dependencies that goes back to the first node, so that the banks involved in such a
structure are indirectly lending from and borrowing to all others. Therefore their default
conditions depend on all others’ defaults. In contrast, an acyclic structure, implies that
some banks are not lending to any other. It is thus possible to compute univocally the
default state of those banks independently of any other bank. Once we know their status,
the default status of their lender can be determined univocally. The same process is
iterated recursively to the lenders of the lenders until a unique vector of all default states
is reached (i.e., a unique equilibrium). This result is in line with the finding of previous
model in a more specific context (Stiglitz and Greenwald, 2003)[Chapt. 7].
The second aspect is related to the dependencies among the default states. If, for a
given shock on the external assets, the default condition of bank i does not change whether
i’s borrowing counterparties default or not because, for instance, both thresholds are above
1 or below -1 or equal, then there are no multiple equilibria for bank i. Accordingly, the
second condition in the above Proposition, states that the default of a borrower of bank i
in the cycle must imply a difference on the default condition of bank i. Note that in the
Proposition we use the cutoff expression (see Equation (16)) for the thresholds in order
to account for the fact that the interval between the thresholds must intersect the shock
domain [−1, 1].
While it might be intuitive to think that the different structure will lead to different
profiles of multiplicity in the shock space, Proposition (1) allows to gains precise insights
regarding specific structures. For example, several network structures are represented in
Figure (2).
For the tree structure, which is acyclical, we can deduce that, for all combinations of
shocks, the equilibrium will be unique. The same holds for the star-out structure. On
the contrary, the complete and ring structure will display multiple equilibria as long as
condition 2 of Proposition (1) holds. From condition 1 in Proposition (1), we can also
state a sufficient condition on the interbank market to ensure unicity of the equilibrium.
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Corollary 1. An interbank market where banks only act as borrowers or lenders always
lead to a unique equilibrium for the default state.
This result is obtained from the fact that, in a directed graph, if the nodes have only
out-going or in-coming links, for sure there cannot be a directed cycle. In other words,
in a market where bank play only one role (borrowing or lending), there are no cyclical
interdependencies and thus no multiplicity of equilibria.
(a) Ring
1
2
3
4
(b) Star-out
1
2
3 4
(c) Complete
1 2
3 4
(d) Tree
1
23
4
Figure 2: Example of network structures
4. Probability of Default
We now show how our model can be used to compute the individual and systemic
probability of default, given a network of contracts and a joint probability density function
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of shocks on external assets. In order to compute the systemic probability of default, in
analogy to the individual default indicator, we define a systemic default indicator χsys as
follows:
χsys = Πiχi. (17)
The definition implies that χsys = 1 only when all banks default, i.e. χi = 1 ∀ i and
χsys = 0 otherwise. Note that this definition can be modified to account for a more
granular definition of systemic default. For example, if we consider as systemic default a
situation in which more than half of the banks default, we have
χsys =
{
1 if
∑
i χi >
n
2
0 else
Let us first consider the case in which Equation (11) has a unique solution for every
combination of shocks. Given the individual and systemic indicators of default, we can
compute the individual (resp. systemic) probability of default by integrating the indi-
vidual (resp. systemic) default indicator across the whole space of shocks, weighted by
the joint probability associated with each shock combination. The result is stated in the
following proposition.
Proposition 2 (The expression of default probability). Consider a market of N banks
with a unique equilibrium for the default state χ. The expression of default probability of
bank i Pi and the systemic default probability P
sys are as follows:
∀i Pi =
∫
χi(u) p(u) du, (18)
P sys =
∫
χsys(u) p(u) du, (19)
where χi is a solution of Equation (11) and p(u) denotes the joint probability distribution
of the shocks.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Notice that by weighting the elements of the shock space by the joint probability dis-
tribution of the shocks we account for possible correlations across shocks. Any correlation
structure can be embedded in the function p(u).
4.1. Multiple equilibria and probability of default
In the presence of multiple equilibria of the default state χ for a given combination
of shocks, the formula of Proposition (2) cannot be applied anymore, because, when
integrating over the shock space, the integrand can take several values for the same shock.
In order to overcome this problem, we resort to the idea of scenarios. Depending on
the scenario, for any given shock for which multiple equilibria exist, one equilibrium is
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selected according to a predefined rule. More precisely, we define the worst and the best
equilibrium as the function that for any given shock u, selects the solution in which the
largest (resp. the smallest) number of banks default.
Definition 4. Given the set {χsysk (u)} of all the possible solutions for the default condi-
tions of Equation (11) for any given shock u, the worst equilibrium is the function of the
shock u: χsys +(u) = maxk{χsysk (u)}. The best equilibrium is the function of the shock u:
χsys −(u) = mink{χsysk (u)}
In the following we will refer to the best (worst) scenario as the one in which the
best (worst) equilibrium is selected. Accordingly, we define as P+ (respectively P−) the
systemic default probabilities in the two scenarios.
Definition 5. The systemic default probability in the worst (+) (“pessimistic”) sce-
nario and best (−) (“optimistic”) is defined as:
P± =
∫
χsys±(u) p(u) du. (20)
We define as uncertainty on the systemic default probability the difference between
the systemic default probability in the two scenarios:
∆P = P+ − P−. (21)
We define as uncertainty area, the portion of the shock space in which the worst and
the best equilibria are different.
∆U =
∫
(χsys+(u)− χsys−(u)) du. (22)
Note that the following inequality always holds, and it holds strictly in the case of
multiple equilibria.
∆P = P+ − P− ≥ 0, (23)
By measuring the difference between the probabilities of systemic default in the best and
the worst scenario, the quantity ∆P is also a measure of the uncertainty in the assessment
of P sys, due to the presence of multiple equilibria.
In the following, we obtain analytical expressions for this measure and we provide
results on how it depends on the network structure and the balance sheet of the banks.
To make the presentation more intuitive, we start with a simple example.
4.2. Example: A Market of 2 Banks
Let us take a market composed of only 2 banks that lend to and borrow from each
other. For the sake of simplicity, let us assume the distribution of shocks to be uniform
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and uncorrelated. In this simple case, bank 1 and bank 2 experience respectively the
shocks u1 and u2 on their external assets, and their default state depends on each other’s
default state. More precisely, their default condition threshold θi can take 2 values. In
formulas, we have:
θi =
{
θ−i =
−εiµi−1
εiσi
if xij = 1
θ+i =
−εiµi−1
εiσi
+
βi(1−Rij)
εiσi
if xij = Rij
(24)
The case of 2 banks can be easily illustrated on the 2-dimensional shock space of the
2 banks, as shown in Figure (3). Recall that θ−i defines the threshold below which the
bank defaults unconditionally while the case of θ+i defines the threshold below which the
bank defaults conditional on the other bank’s default. The space can be divided into 4
different regions characterized by the ordered pair of default states. Recall that the value
of interbank liability of bank i and its default state are related as follows: xBij = 1 iff
χj = 0 (no default) and x
B
ij = Rij iff χj = 1, see Equation (4). Therefore, we have:
(xB1 , x
B
2 ) =

(1, 1) when ui > θ
−
i ∀i;
(1, R) when u1 > θ
+
1 and u2 < θ
−
2 ;
(R, 1) when u1 < θ
−
1 and u2 > θ
+
2 ;
(R,R) when ui < θ
+
i ∀i;
(25)
Notice that the first and fourth conditions in the list above hold simultaneously for certain
values of u1, u2, implying that there is a multiplicity of equilibria. In particular the
equilibrium in which both banks default and the one in which no bank defaults coexist
in the following region of shocks, indicated in blue in Figure (3).
(1, 1) AND (R,R) when θ−1 < u1 < θ
+
1 and θ
−
2 < u2 < θ
+
2 . (26)
Following Equation (20), and recalling we have assumed in this example a uniform
distribution of shocks in the space [−1, 1] (hence p(u) = 1), we can provide the analytical
expression of P+ and P−. Indeed, the region where the default indicator equals 1 is the
region defined by the fourth condition in Equation (25). We thus obtain:
P+ =
(1 + θˆ+1 )(1 + θˆ
+
2 )
4
(27)
P− =
(1 + θˆ+1 )(1 + θˆ
+
2 )
4
− (θˆ
+
1 − θˆ−1 )(θˆ+2 − θˆ−2 )
4
(28)
∆P =
(θˆ+1 − θˆ−1 )(θˆ+2 − θˆ−2 )
4
(29)
Assuming that banks are homogenous and that θˆi = θi, we obtain an expression of ∆P
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Figure 3: The shock space and the regions where the various configurations of (xB1 , x
B
2 ) are equilibria.
Region to the left of dotted red line when Bank 1 default all the time, region below dotted green line when
Bank 2 defaults all the time, region below red and green line when the default of a bank is conditional
on the other bank.
as a function of the banks’ exposure to the external assets and to the interbank:
∆P =
(θ+ − θ−)2
4
= (
β(1−R)
2εσ
)2 (30)
Note that, with the uniform distribution of the shocks, the portion of the shock space
that is affected by multiple equilibria is simply ∆U = ∆P .
The above example highlights how mutual interdependencies leads to multiple out-
comes of the default probability. Moreover, in the homogeneous case, the difference
between the probability of default in the best and the worse equilibrium as well as the
area of the region of multiplicity, increases with the exposure to losses on the interbank
market (i.e., measured by βi(1 − R)). In contrast, they both decrease with volatility on
the external markets (i.e., measured by σi).
4.3. A Ring Market of n Banks
We now generalise the results illustrated above in the simplest case of two banks to a
market of n banks arranged in two types of benchmark structures: a ring and a star. Let
us start with the ring structure, defined as follows.
Definition 6. A ring market is a network composed of contracts arranged in one cycle
Cn
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In light of the discussion of Proposition (1), in this market there is a closed chain of
dependencies from any bank i through the whole set of other (n− 1) banks. For the sake
of simplicity, we postpone the analysis of correlation across shocks to Section (4.5) and
we assume a uniform distribution of shocks. We can state the following proposition.
Proposition 3 (Effect of Multiplicity in a Ring Market). Consider n banks with interbank
credit, arranged in a ring market. Assume: recovery rate Ri < 1 and interbank leverage
βi > 0; external leverage εi and shock variance σi positive and finite; shock average µi
finite; the joint probability distribution of shocks p(u) is uniform and with no correlation
across shocks. Then:
1. The uncertainty ∆P on the default probabilities in the worst and best scenario,
P+ and P− increases with the interbank leverage βi of the banks; it inversely
increases with the fraction of collateral Ri; it decreases with the external asset
leverage εi; it decreases with the variance on the shocks σi. Its expression reads:
∆P = Πni=1(
θˆ+i − θˆ−i
2
) (31)
2. if θˆi = θi ∀i, the uncertainty ∆P decreases with the length n of the ring market
and the expression reads
∆P = Πni=1(
βi(1−Ri)
2εiσi
) (32)
Proof. See Appendix C.
The proof is analogous to the computation illustrated above in the example of two
banks. Note that the expression of the portion of the shock space subject to multiple equi-
libria ∆U follows the same equation as in Equation (32) under the uniform distribution
assumption. Hence similar results can be inferred.
The above proposition shows that uncertainty increases with the leverage on the in-
terbank, proportionally to the loss exposure (taking into account the collateral, i.e., with
βi(1−Ri)). This result stems from the fact that the probability of default in the optimistic
scenario (i.e., selecting the best equilibrium) decreases with respect to the interbank ex-
posure (see proof). This shows that increase in the reliance on the interbank market
increases the uncertainty in terms of systemic risk but improves the outcome in case the
optimistic scenario is realised.
Moreover, uncertainty decreases with the leverage on the external market and its
volatility (i.e. with εiσi). This means that an increase in diversification in a bank’s
portfolio of external assets increases uncertainty. The result seems counterintuitive but it
simply stems from the fact that, in relative terms, the smaller the variance of the shocks
on the external assets, the smaller the role of the shocks in determining whether banks
default or not and thus the larger the role played by the interbank assets. In particular,
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if the variance of the shocks is very small and the interbank assets of banks exceed their
equity, then, no matter what is the value of the shocks, in the scenario in which interbank
assets are lost, default would occur with probability one.
Finally, the product in the expression of the uncertainty in the above proposition
implies that the uncertainty decreases with the length n of the cycle as long as βi(1−Ri)
2εiσi
< 1,
which is guaranteed if θˆ = θ (see proof). This means that the uncertainty of a ring market
decreases exponentially with its size only if the relative weight of the interbank assets over
the external assets is small enough.
4.4. A Star Market of n Banks
Let us now move to the case of a star market. In a star market, we have a central
counterparty for all the banks in the periphery, both for their borrowing and lending
relationships. We illustrate a case of 5 banks in Figure (4).
Definition 7. A star market is a network composed of one bank in the center, denoted
by c, and n− 1 banks in the periphery, denoted by the index j. All banks in the periphery
only lend to and borrow from the bank at the center.
1
2
3
4
5
Figure 4: Star Market
For the sake of simplicity, in the following we assume that the bank at the center lends
uniformly across its borrowing counterparties. We thus have that: Bcj =
1
|Vc| where Vc is
the set of borrowers of the bank at the center. Note that we now have a system made of
multiple cycles. As a result, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 4 (Effect of Multiplicity in a Star Market). Consider n banks with interbank
credit arranged as a star network. Assume: recovery rate Ri < 1 and interbank leverage
βi > 0; external leverage εi and shock variance σi positive and finite; shock average µi
finite; the joint probability distribution of shocks p(u) is uniform and with no correlation
across shocks. Then:
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The uncertainty ∆P on the default probabilities in the worst and best scenario, P+ and
P−
∆P = Πni=1
( θˆ+i − θˆ−i
2
)
+
(θˆ+c − θˆc(
∑
j χj = 1))Π
n−1
j=1 (1 + θˆ
+
j )
2n
(33)
Proof. See Appendix C.
Comparing Equation (33) for the star market with Equation (32) for the ring market,
we observe that the first part of the star market expression is equal to the ring market. In
fact, this term comes from the region of overlap between the cases in which all counter-
parties default and no one defaults. Such situation is thus similar to the ring case. There
are however other equilibria overlap to account for in the case of the start market. Those
equilibria correspond to cases where (1) the bank at the center does not default, (2) at
least one peripheral bank default and (3) at least one peripheral bank survives.
Overall, we thus see that the uncertainty on the probability in the best and the worst
equilibrium increases when we move from a ring market to a star market mainly because
of the increase of cyclicality within the market structure.
4.5. Effect of Correlation
We now explore how the uncertainty (i.e., the distance between the best and worse
possible probabilities) is affected when we introduce correlations between the shocks on
the external assets. In order to illustrate the effect of correlation in the simplest terms,
we focus on the case of a ring market structure and we assume a uniform distribution
of shocks in [−1, 1]. Under the assumption of uniformity, the uncertainty on the default
probability coincides with the area of the region of multiplicity. We further consider the
case of fully correlated shock and we compare the results with those of uncorrelated shocks
from Proposition (3).
Proposition 5 (Effect of Correlation). Consider a market of n banks with interbank credit
arranged in a ring. Assume: recovery rate R < 1 and interbank leverage βi > 0; external
leverage εi and shock variance σi positive and finite; shock average µ finite. Shocks are
distributed uniformly. Denote by ∆PU the uncertainty in case of uncorrelated shocks and
by ∆PC the uncertainty in case of fully correlated shocks. Then, the following statements
hold.
1. In the case of full shock correlation, the uncertainty on the default probability in the
best and worst scenario is:
∆PC = max
{min{θ+i } −max{θ−i }
2
, 0
}
, (34)
and if min{θ+i } ≤ max{θ−i }, there in no uncertainty, ∆PC = 0.
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2. ∆PC > ∆PU if ∃ k ∈ N s.t. min{θ+i } = θ+k and max{θ−i } = θ−k , i.e. complete
correlation yields larger uncertainty than no correlation. As a special case, in a
ring of identical banks, complete correlation implies larger uncertainty than in the
uncorrelated case.
3. ∆PC < ∆PU if n
√
min{θ+i } −max{θ−i } < min{θ+i − θ−i }, i.e. complete correlation
yields smaller uncertainty area than no correlation.
4. ∆PC > ∆PU if n
√
min{θ+i } −max{θ−i } > max{θ+i − θ−i }, i.e. then complete
correlation yields larger uncertainty area than no correlation.
Proof. See Appendix D.
In the proposition above, the expression of ∆PC is obtained from a projecting the
n-dimensional hypercuboid of the shock space onto its diagonal. Indeed, fully correlated
shocks imply that all the shocks hitting all banks have the same value at a time.
From this projection, the determination of the uncertainty depends on the maximal
threshold distance, i.e. the distance between the smallest θ+i across all banks i and the
largest θ−i , i.e. the smallest maximal and the largest minimal default thresholds across all
the banks in the system.
The first point in the proposition above states that the uncertainty is completely
removed if the system has a maximal threshold distance equal to 0, i.e. if there is a
bank with a maximal default threshold that is smaller than the largest minimal default
threshold.
Second, compared to the case of no correlation, full correlation brings in more un-
certainty when the two threshold yielding the maximal threshold distance belong to the
same bank. This means that there is a bank k for which the interval [θ−k , θ
−
k ] is comprised
within the intervals [θ−i , θ
−
i ] of all the other banks. An important consequence is that in
an homogenous ring, full correlation implies more uncertainty than in the uncorrelated
case.
Third, correlation also brings more uncertainty when the n− th root of the maximal
threshold distance is higher then the maximum distance between the 2 extreme thresholds
of a single bank in the system. On the contrary, correlation brings less uncertainty when
the n− th root of the maximal threshold distance is smaller than the minimum distance
between the 2 extreme thresholds of a single bank in the system.
Overall, the above proposition shows that the relationship between correlation and
uncertainty is in general non-monotonous.
5. Expected Individual and Systemic Losses
We are now interested in devising a measure delivering information on the expected
monetary loss in the system at time 2.
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Proposition 6 (Expected loss). Consider a market of n banks with interbank credit. The
expression of expected losses of bank i, Ei[loss], and the total expected losses E
sys[loss]
are as follows:
∀i Ei[loss] =
∫
ei(εi + βi − γi − 1)χi(u)p(u)du, (35)
Esys[loss] =
∫ ∑
i
ei(εi + βi − γi − 1)χi(u)p(u)du, (36)
where χi is a solution of Equation (11) and p(u) denotes the joint probability distribution
of the shocks.
Given the individual probabilities of default of each bank, we compute the expected
loss that each bank causes to its creditors in case of default. Given a realisation of shocks,
if bank i defaults, the aggregate amount of money that is lost from its interbank creditors
and its external investors is equal to the total liability of bank i minus the amount posted
as a collateral (i.e., ei(εi + βi − γi − 1) ). Hence, in order to compute the expected loss
from bank i, we integrate the aggregated monetary loss over the whole range of shocks
accounting for the cases where bank i defaults (i.e., χi = 1 ).
For the total expected loss, that is, the total amount of money expected to be lost due
to the default of any bank at the system level, we simply aggregate the individual losses
for each realisation of shocks (i.e.,
∑
i ei(εi + βi − γi − 1)χi(u)) and integrate over the
whole range of shocks. Note that in this way, we can simply use the individual default
indicator and do not need to identify any systemic default indicator.
Similar to the probabilities of default, several values of expected losses can be obtained
as soon as we have multiple equilibria. In that case, we define ∆Esys[loss] as the distance
between the lowest and highest total expected losses E−[loss] and E+[loss], respectively.
Using this metric, we can now measure how multiplicity affects the assessment on expected
losses. Ultimately, we are thus able to formalize a method to compute a monetary price
for the cost of uncertainty.
5.1. Example: Market of 2 Banks.
We illustrate the computation of expected losses with an example of a market of 2
banks lending and borrowing from each other. For the sake of clarity, let us assume
that the distribution of shocks is homogenous and uncorrelated. Let us also define e∗i =
ei(εi + βi − γi − 1). Losses occur each time at least one bank defaults. With 2 banks,
we have 3 different combinations: bank 1 defaults while bank 2 does not; bank 2 defaults
while bank 1 does not; both banks default. We thus have:
Esys[loss] = e∗1P ({χ1 = 1, χ2 = 0}) + e∗2P ({χ2 = 1, χ1 = 0})
+ (e∗1 + e
∗
2)P ({χ1 = 1, χ2 = 1})
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The last component of the right hand side bears the multiple equilibria issues defined in
the Example (4.2) (i.e., P ({χ1 = 1, χ2 = 1}). From Example (4.2) we can derive the
expression of highest and lowest total expected losses:
E+ sys[loss] =
e∗1(1− θ+1 )
4
+
e∗2(1− θ+2 )
4
+ (e∗1 + e
∗
2)P
+
=
e∗1(1− θ+1 ) + e∗2(1− θ+2 ) + (e∗1 + e∗2)(1 + θ+1 )(1 + θ+2 )
4
E− sys[loss] =
e∗1(1− θ+1 )
4
+
e∗2(1− θ+2 )
4
+ (e∗1 + e
∗
2)P
−
=
e∗1(1− θ+1 ) + e∗2(1− θ+2 )
4
+
(e∗1 + e
∗
2)[(1 + θ
+
1 )(1 + θ
+
2 )− (θ+1 − θ−1 )(θ+2 − θ−2 )]
4
Finally, we can identify the effect of equilibrium choice on the expected loss assessment,
which we identify by ∆Esys[loss]:
∆Esys[loss] =
(e∗1 + e
∗
2)[(1 + θ
+
1 )(1 + θ
+
2 )− (θ+1 − θ−1 )(θ+2 − θ−2 )]
4
∆Esys[loss] = (e∗1 + e
∗
2)∆P
If we consider that banks are homogenous and that θˆ = θ, we obtain:
∆Esys[loss] = 2e(+ β − γ − 1)(β(1−R)
2εσ
)2
6. Discussion
In this paper, we investigate how the network structure resulting from credit ties
among financial agents (i.e., banks) can affect the capacity of a regulator to assess the
level of systemic risk. We introduce a model to compute the individual and systemic
probability of default in a system of banks connected in a generic interbank network and
exposed to shocks with a generic correlation structure. We find that multiple equilibria
can exist even in the presence of complete knowledge.
Our main contribution is to show that multiple equilibria can arise from the presence
of closed chains of debt in the network (i.e., cycles). Note that this mechanism differs
from the one described in previous works where multiple equilibria result from self-fulling
expectations (e.g., (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983)). In its simplest form, our result states
that, if the default conditions of a set of banks are mutually dependent along cycles of
credit contracts, there exists a range of external shocks such that the equilibrium where
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all those banks default and the equilibrium where none of them defaults co-exist. More
generally, in any network structure the multiplicity of equilibria can arise in the presence of
at least one closed chain of lending ties in the market. It is worth noting that, empirically,
closed chains of lending ties are ubiquitous in financial markets. Indeed, a large portion of
various national interbank markets is often found to be strongly connected , i.e. connected
through at least one closed chain (Roukny et al., 2014). Furthermore, the core-periphery
structure identified in many cases of inter-bank markets (Fricke and Lux, 2012; Craig
and Von Peter, 2014; van Lelyveld et al., 2014) is characterized by an important level of
cyclical dependencies between the core-banks (i.e., they form a fully connected network).
The importance of multiple equilibria and the fact that focusing only on the best or
the worst equilibrium might be insufficient is witnessed by the growing interest not only
in the academic literature but also in policy debates (Draghi, 2012; Miller and Zhang,
2014; De Grauwe and Ji, 2015).
Beyond the mere existence of multiple equilibria, the range of shocks where multiplicity
occurs as well as the difference in expected losses across equilibria are also very important.
Multiplicity is particularly relevant if both the range of shocks and the gap on the expected
losses are large.
In this respect, in this paper we develop an analytical framework to formalize the
problem and quantify the gap in relation to the network structure. We quantify this
uncertainty by analytically computing the difference between the most extreme scenarios.
The optimistic scenario is the one where, when multiple equilibria exist, the equilibrium
with the minimum number of defaults is selected. Similarly, the pessimistic scenario
is constructed by selecting the equilibrium with the maximum number of defaults. In
addition, we also provide a method to quantify such difference in monetary terms (i.e.
expected losses), thus allowing to assess the cost of uncertainty.
Furthermore, we investigate how such uncertainty depends on leverage, volatility, in-
terbank market structures and correlation across external shocks. We find that leverage
both on the interbank market and the external assets increases uncertainty. Volatility
in external assets has ambiguous effects. Correlation across shocks can also have non
monotonous effects on uncertainty. However, complete correlation in a set of homogenous
banks univocally increases uncertainty with respect to the uncorrelated case. In terms of
network structure, we show that the uncertainty decreases with the length of the credit
chain. When analysing a market composed of multiple cycles (i.e., star market), we find
that uncertainty increases compared to single-cycle structures.
By design, the model and the analysis could be applied to real data and parameters
could be calibrated using information on assets portfolios, credit registers and balance
sheets. The model can be used to assess both the level of (individual and systemic) risk
and the uncertainty arising from the interconnectedness.
Finally, the work also contributes to several policy related discussions. As it offers a
novel way to estimate the systemic impact of financial institutions in a network context,
it can bring new insights in the discussion about too-big-to-fail institutions (Haldane and
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May, 2011; BoE, 2013). By showing how cyclical structures in the network imply more
uncertainty over default probability, we also contribute to the discussion on regulatory
financial data disclosure (Abbe et al., 2012; Alvarez and Barlevy, 2014).
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Appendix A. Proof of Proposition 1
We separate the proof in two parts. In the first we show the necessity of cyclicality
in the network of contract and in the second part we show that, once we have a cycle,
the sufficient condition to have multiple equilibria is that there is an overlap between the
space of default thresholds depending on the counterparties’ status in the cycle and the
space of shocks.
We demonstrate the first part by looking at graph that do not exhibit any cyclicality.
If the graph of dependencies is an acyclic graph, then we can identify the leafs (banks
who do not lend to anyone) and recursively the parents of every bank in the interbank
network (the creditor of those banks). For every vector of shocks u, the state of default
χ of the leafs is determined and unique. Recursively, the state of all parent nodes is also
determined and unique. Therefore, in order to have multiple solutions, the graph must
not be acyclic and thus contain at least one cycle. Notice that only the nodes in the cycle
and those pointing directly or indirectly to the cycle may display multiple solutions. All
the other nodes, e.g. those that are not part of a cycle or that cannot reach the cycle
along a path, will have a unique default state.
We now move to the sufficient condition once we have a cyclical graph. Following the
assumptions that R < 1 and β > 0, we have that θ−i < θ
+
i for all i ∈ N . Assume that
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there is a cycle. If θˆi(χi+1 = 0) 6= θˆi(χi+1 = 1), we have that [θi(χi+1 = 0), θi(χi+1 =
1)] ∩ [−1, 1] 6= ∅.
Then the fact that the threshold values are strictly different for every node in the cycle
and include some values of the shock domain involves the fact that there is an overlap of
equilibria with respect to the shock space. In fact, the following two sets of equilibrium
conditions overlap because θ−i < θ
+
i for all i ∈ N .
(xB1 , ..., x
B
m) = (1, .., 1) ⇐⇒

u1 > θ1(x
B
2 = 1) = θ
−
1
...
um > θm(x
B
1 = 1) = θ
−
m
(xB1 , ..., x
B
m) = (R, .., R) ⇐⇒

u1 < θ1(x
B
2 = R) = θ
+
1
...
um < θm(x
B
1 = R) = θ
+
m
(A.1)
In the system above there are m banks in a cycle, numbered in ascending order along
the direction of lending. Bank m lends to bank 1, thus closing the cycle. We thus see
that the two equilibria co-exist in the space of shocks defined by θ−i < ui < θ
+
i .
Appendix B. Proof of Proposition 2
We show here that, once the default status of all the banks is known for every combi-
nation of shocks and that each combination of shocks is associated with a probability, we
can compute the probability of default of every banks individually and the the probability
of systemic default.
In fact, for any given default state χ, we can determine the values of the thresholds
θ = f(χ). For example, in a market of two banks, we have:
(χ1, χ2) = (1, 1)
iff u1 > θ
1
1(χ2 = 1) and u2 > θ
1
2(χ1 = 1)
From the values of the thresholds in the space of shocks, we can determine the indi-
vidual probability of default Pis.
Recall that the space of shocks is weighted by the probability distribution of the shocks,
which account for possible correlations. Every default condition holds in a region of the
space. As the default information is retrieved by the binary default indicator χi summing
up the area where a given condition holds gives its probability of occurrence. Hence we
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have that:
∀i Pi =
∫
χi(u) p(u) du,
P sys =
∫
χsys(u) p(u) du,
where the systemic default indicator χsys is function of the individual one. In this paper,
we mostly define is as χsys = Πiχi.
Appendix C. Proof of Proposition 3 and 4
To compute the distance between the best and worst probabilities of systemic default,
stemming from the optimistic and pessimistic scenarios respectively, we introduce an
generic algorithm that we then apply to the network structure of interest.
First, recall that we are interested in identifying the portion of the shock space where
multiple equilibria exist, with respect to our goal of assessing the level of systemic risk. We
are thus primarily interested in the identifying the area of systemic default. With respect
to our systemic default indicator χsys = Πiχi, we are looking for the equilibrium where
every bank defaults. It is equivalent to the vector of default states {χi = 1} ∀i. Such
equilibrium corresponds to a situation where, for every bank, the shock is ui < θ
+
i because
this threshold is the one accounting for the default of all the borrowing counterpaties of
bank i. The shock space is thus {θi < θ+i } ∀i. We also know that all the other default
threshold have a value inferior to θ+i (see Section (2)).
Next, we need to find the equilibria with ranges of shock values that overlap with the
above equilibrium. Those equilibria are the equilibria for which the ranges of shocks form a
non-empty set of intersection with the systemic default equilibrium shock space. Formally,
we need to the find the set of conditions with respect to ui such that {θ∗i < θ+i } ∀i. There
can by several sets of condition (i.e., several equilibria that overlap with the systemic
default equilibria). Note that the overlapping equilibria necessarily have their set of
default threshold different then θ+.
Finally, we sum the fraction of shock space that overlaps between the systemic default
equilibria and all the candidate. This provides the value of ∆U . We then use the joint
probability distribution of shocks to determine ∆P .
Appendix C.1. Application to the Ring Structure.
In a cycle, each agent has only 2 thresholds:
θi ∈ {θ−i = θi(xi+1 = 0), θ+i = (xi+1 = R)}
As previously defined, our equilibrium of interest is {χi = 1} ∀i and the shock space is
{ui < θ+i } ∀i. The overlapping equilibria are the ones where θi is different for all i. The
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only case is thus: {ui > θ−i } ∀i. This corresponds to the equilibrium {χi = 0} ∀i. For
each agent, the level of overlap is (θ+i − θ−i ). In the n-dimensional, we take the product
to obtain the n-volume and then divide by the total n-volume:
∆U =
Πi(θˆ
+
i − θˆ−i )
2n
We then obtain the expression for the probabilities, as
∆P =
Πi(Pˆi(θˆ
+
i )− Pˆi(θˆ−i ))
2n
Where Pˆi(u) is the cumulative density function obtained from joint probability function
p(u) projected on bank i.
If we assume a uniform density function, we obtain a result equal the ∆U and we can
develop furthermore the expression to highlight the role of the different parameter of the
system:
∆P =
Πi(θˆ
+
i − θˆ−i )
2n
= Πi(
βi(1−Ri)
2εiσi
)
Appendix C.2. Application to the Star Structure.
We assume Bik =
1
|Vi| . We denote by index c the center agent in the star and j the
agents in the periphery.
In a star, agents in the periphery have only 2 thresholds:
θj ∈ {θ−j = θj(xc = 0), θ+j = (xc = R)}
While the agent at the center has n thresholds:
θc ∈ {θ−c , θc(
∑
j
χj = 1), θc(
∑
j
χj = 2), ..., θc(
∑
j
χj = n− 1), θ+c }
Again, the equilibrium of interest is {χi = 1} ∀i and the shock space is {ui < θ+i } ∀i. The
overlapping equilibria are the ones where θi is different for all i.
The overlapping equilibria are thus all the combinations of shock ranges using the thresh-
olds θc < θ
+
c and θj = θ
−
j . The case where θc = θ
−
c yields a result similar to the ring:
Πi(θˆ
+
i − θˆ−i )
2n
and thus, we introduce the cumulative density function to yields the expression in terms
of probabilities distance
Πi(Pˆi(θˆ
+
i )− Pˆi(θˆ−i ))
2n
29
In all other cases the fraction of overlapping shock space can be determined as follows. For
each θc, all ranges of values for the other shocks are fulfilled in aggregating the overlapping
equilibria. Hence the conditions for the periphery agents are {uj < θ+j } ∀j. The fraction
of the shocks space is thus:
(θˆ+c − θˆc(
∑
j χj = 1)))Πj(1 + θˆ
+
j )
2n
Similarly translating in probabilities distance, we obtain
(Pˆc(θˆ
+
c )− Pˆc(θˆc(
∑
j χj = 1)))Πj(Pˆj(θˆ
+
j ))
2n
Finally, we sum of the elements and obtain:
→ ∆U = Πi(θˆ
+
i − θˆ−i )
2n
+
(θˆ+c − θˆc(
∑
j χj = 1)))Πj(1 + θˆ
+
j )
2n
→ ∆P = Πi(Pˆi(θˆ
+
i )− Pˆi(θˆ−i ))
2n
+
(Pˆc(θˆ
+
c )− Pˆc(θˆc(
∑
j χj = 1)))Πj(Pˆj(θˆ
+
j ))
2n
If we assume a uniform density function and that θˆi = θi, we obtain a result equal the
∆U and we can develop furthermore the expression to highlight the role of the different
parameter of the system:
∆P = Πi(
βi(1−Ri)
2εiσi
) +
(θ+c − θc(
∑
j χj = 1))Πj(1 + θ
+
j )
2n
Appendix D. Proof of Proposition 5
In this proof, we analyse a situation where the returns on all banks’ portfolio are
completely correlated. Let us start with a case of 2 banks lending and borrowing from
each other. From the 2-dimensional representation, a fully correlated situation can be
obtained by projecting the results obtained in the Example in Section (4) on the diagonal
such that u1 = u2 for all combinations of shocks. We then need to compute the length
of the diagonal that is under the different areas. The fraction of this length on the total
lengths of the diagonal will give us the probability value.
P− =
√
(1 +max{θˆ−i })2 + (1 +max{θˆ−i })2
2
√
2
=
|1 +max{θˆ−i }|
2
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P+ =
√
(1 +min{θˆ+i })2 + (1 +min{θˆ+i })2
2
√
2
=
|1 +min{θˆ+i }|
2
∆P =
1 +min{θˆ+i }
2
− 1 +max{θˆ
−
i }
2
=
min{θˆ+i } −max{θˆ−i }
2
Note that we can remove the absolute values as 0 ≤ 1 + θˆi. The results are the same
when we generalise to a system of n banks arranged in a ring, as shown in what follows:
P− =
√∑
i(1 +max{θˆ−i })2
2
√
n
=
|1 +max{θˆ−i }|
2
P+ =
√∑
i(1 +min{θˆ+i })2
2
√
n
=
|1 +min{θˆ+i }|
2
∆P =
1 +min{θˆ+i }
2
− 1 +max{θˆ
−
i }
2
=
min{θˆ+i } −max{θˆ−i }
2
Appendix D.1. Comparative Statics
We are now interested in comparing the difference of best of worst probability in a ring
market where shocks are completely correlated with the case where shocks are completely
independent.
Given the expression for the uncorrelated case (∆P u =
(θˆ+1 −θˆ−1 )(θˆ+2 −θˆ−2 )
4
) and for the
correlated case (∆P c =
min{θˆ+i }−max{θˆ−i }
2
), we can explore how increasing correlation affects
the uncertainty area.
Note that in case min{θˆ+i } ≤ max{θˆ−i }, there is no uncertainty in the correlation.
In case min{θˆ+i } = θˆ+1 and max{θˆ−i } = θˆ−1 : ∆P u = ∆P c θˆ
+
2 −θˆ−2
2
. Given that −2 ≤
θˆ+2 − θˆ−2 ≤ 2:
∆P u < ∆P c
The same stands if min{θˆ+i } = θˆ+2 and max{θˆ−i } = θˆ−2 . In general: min{θˆ+i } and
max{θˆ−j } have i = j.
In case min{θˆ+i } and max{θˆ−j } have i 6= j: Note that:
(θˆ+1 − θˆ−2 ) < (θˆ+i − θˆ−i ) ∀i
We look at the 2 extreme cases:
min{θˆ+i − θˆ−i }n
2n
< ∆P u <
max{θˆ+i − θˆ−i }n
2n
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For the upperbound, we have that:
∆P u <
max{θˆ+i − θˆ−i }n
2n
if n
√
min{θˆ+i } −max{θˆ−i } > max{θˆ+i − θˆ−i }, we thus have that:
∆P u < ∆P c
For the lower bound, we have:
∆P u >
min{θˆ+i − θˆ−i }n
2n
if n
√
min{θˆ+i } −max{θˆ−i } < min{θˆ+i − θˆ−i }, we thus have that:
∆P u > ∆P c
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